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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant's statement of jurisdiction is incorrect, as the appeal was improperly 
initiated in the Utah Supreme Court. The case was presumably transferred to this Court 
pursuant to Rule 44, Utah R. App. P., governing improperly pursued appeals. In any event, 
because this is an appeal from the district court involving domestic relations, the Utah Court 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(i).1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant attempts to raise three issues on appeal; however, he argued only 
the second issue in the district court. The issues raised are as follows: 
1. Whether there are material issues of fact precluding summary judgment? 
(a) This issue was not preserved in the district court. Plaintiff did not argue that 
summary judgment was precluded by the existence of material issues of fact. (R. 259.) In 
fact, plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and argued that summary judgment 
was appropriate. (R. 230, 251-52.) 
(b) If addressed, the district court's conclusion that there are no material issues of 
fact is reviewed for correctness. Neiderhauser Builders and Development Corp. v. Campbell, 
824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah App. 1992). 
2. Whether it was impossible for plaintiff timely to register his paternity through no 
fault of his own? 
(a) This is the only issue specifically argued by plaintiff and decided in the district 
court. (R. 254, 288.) 
On a related matter, the designation of case priority on the cover of Appellant's Brief is also incorrect. 
The priority is not category 2, pertaining to criminal convictions, but category 4, which includes appeals from 
orders concerning child custody or termination of parental rights. Rules 27(c) and 29(b), Utah R. App. P. 
(b) The district court's ruling that timely registration was not impossible is reviewed 
for correctness. In re Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Utah App. 1995). 
3. Whether requiring plaintiff to register a claim of paternity violates his due process 
rights.2 
(a) Plaintiff did not argue the due process issue in the district court. Due process is 
not mentioned in the verified complaint, and it is mentioned only in passing, without analysis 
or authority, in plaintiffs summary judgment memorandum. (R. 21, 252.) 
(b) If addressed, the due process issue is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
In re Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Utah App. 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
This appeal is governed by the paternity registration statute, U.C.A. § 78-30-4.8 (1994 
Supp.), which is set forth verbatim in the Addendum. (Add. 43.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by an unwed father to obtain custody of a child relinquished and 
placed for adoption on November 17, 1994. Plaintiff initially filed a paternity action in 
California, but subsequently filed this action in Utah. The district court in this case ruled 
that Utah had exclusive jurisdiction of the issues, and the parties stipulated to dismissal of 
the California action. (R. 171, 174-75.) The district court subsequently granted defendants' 
motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment. 
(R. 285-88.) Plaintiff filed this appeal from the order of summary judgment. (R. 292.) 
2Plaintiff also mixes into this issue the question whether the district court misread In re Adoption of W, 
904 P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1995), as binding precedent. However, the holding in Adoption ofW\s not the 
issue, but the legal basis for deciding the issue. The district court had no choice but to follow that precedent. 
2 
The Utah Supreme Court entered a conditional Order of Dismissal for failure to file 
a docketing statement, but subsequently transferred the case to this Court. (Add. 6.) This 
Court issued a Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition on the basis that the case was 
being considered for summary affirmance under the authority of In re Adoption of W, 904 
P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1995). (Add. 7.) However, the Court later decided to defer decision 
of the issues until plenary presentation and consideration of the case. (Add. 8.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, Mario G. Beltran, and defendant Denise Allan, both age 20 when this action 
began, are single individuals who have never been married. They were residing with their 
respective parents in the State of California when they began dating in 1993. In March of 
1994, Denise informed plaintiff that she was pregnant by him and that the baby was due in 
November 1994. (Verified Complaint, 11U 1-2, 6, R. 20-21; Affidavit of Denise Allan, IfU 2-3, 
R. 212, Add. 10; Deposition of Mario G. Beltran, 3-4, 9-12, 17, 51; Affidavit of Mario G. 
Beltran, UH 2-4, R. 233-34.) 
In approximately May of 1994, plaintiff and Denise ceased dating, and Denise 
informed plaintiff that she had decided to place the baby for adoption. Plaintiff expressed 
opposition to the adoption, but he believed that Denise would proceed with the adoption 
anyway. Thereafter, Denise never told plaintiff that she would not place the baby for 
adoption, and plaintiff understood the continuing possibility of adoption. In approximately 
June 1994, Denise contacted LDS Social Services ("Agency") regarding placing her baby for 
adoption in Utah. Denise subsequently requested plaintiff to complete background 
3 
information forms related to the adoption, and plaintiff complied. (Allan Afft, UU 4-5, R. 
211-12, Add. 10; Beltran Dep. 20-31, 38, 69-72; Beltran Afft, UU 5-8, R. 233.)3 
Around mid-August 1994, Denise left California to reside with her aunt in Provo, 
Utah, where she planned to complete her pregnancy and place the baby for adoption. Prior 
to leaving California, Denise informed plaintiff that she was going to Utah to complete the 
pregnancy and place the baby for adoption. Plaintiff responded by accusing Denise that she 
was leaving out of selfishness and embarrassment to be carrying his baby. Upon arriving in 
Utah, Denise contacted the Agency's Provo office to complete arrangements for the 
adoption. (Allan Afft, HU 6-7, R. 211, Add. 11; Affidavit of Beverly R. Bekker, H 2, R. 188, 
Add. 34; Beltran Dep. 53-56.)4 
Plaintiff acknowledged in his deposition that, following his conversation with Denise in May 1994, he 
believed she would carry out the adoption: 
Q: So she told you over the phone that she was going-that she had decided to place the 
baby for adoption? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What was your response? 
A: Told her no. 
Q: So when that conversation ended you believed that she was going to place the baby for 
adoption? 
A: Yes. After that conversation, after that conversation, yes. [Beltran Dep. 23.] 
4Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that Denise informed him, before she left, that she was going to Utah 
and would return to California after placing the baby for adoption: 
Q: Before she came to Utah did she ever tell you that she would move back to California 
as soon as the child had been placed for adoption? 
A: Yes, yeah. [Beltran Dep. 54.] 
Q: . . . Did she ever tell you that she was planning to move back to California after the 
adoption? 
A: Yes. 
Q: When did she tell you that? 
A: I don't recall. I don't know when she told me that. 
Q: Well, if she told you she was coming back to California right after the adoption, it had 
to have been before she left didn't it? 
4 
While in Utah during the pregnancy, Denise communicated by telephone and letters 
with plaintiff and his mother regarding the planned adoption. In one phone conversation 
with plaintiff around the first of October 1994, Denise reaffirmed her adoption plan to 
plaintiff. In response to one of her letters, Denise received a letter from plaintiffs mother, 
dated October 17, 1994, expressing her "mixed feelings" regarding the proposed adoption. 
(Allan Afft, U 8, R. 211, Add. 11; Beltran Dep. 38-39, 67-71.) 
On October 26, 1994, plaintiff filed a paternity action in California, alleging that he 
was the father of Denise's unborn child, and that Denise had moved to Utah to release the 
child for adoption. Plaintiff mailed a copy of the California paternity complaint to Denise 
and the Agency at their Provo, Utah addresses. Upon receiving the complaint, Denise called 
plaintiff by phone and expressed her surprise and disappointment at his effort to block the 
adoption. Denise reaffirmed her adoption decision and told plaintiff that she had selected 
an adoptive family and was proceeding with the adoption. Following this conversation, 
plaintiff knew that Denise would proceed with the adoption. (Allan Afft, UU 9-10, R. 
210-11, Add. 11-12; Bekker Afft, H 4, R. 188, Add. 34; Beltran Afft, HH 13-15, R. 232; 
Beltran Dep. 48-54, 69-71.)5 
A: I suppose, yes. 
Q: So she told you before she left that she would come right back after the adoption? 
Mr. Moody: If you have a recollection. 
The Witness: Yes. 
Q: (By Mr. Nelson) She did tell you that before she left? 
A: Yes. [Beltran Dep. 55-56.] 
Regarding the telephone conversation with Denise after commencement of the California action, plaintiff 
testified: 
Q: Did she say she would not go ahead with the adoption? 
A: No, she didn't say that. 
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In a letter to plaintiff dated October 27,1994, the Agency confirmed that Denise was 
in Utah and that she intended to place the baby for adoption. Plaintiff subsequently 
consulted with three different California attorneys to stop the adoption, but they each 
explained that they could not help because they did not know Utah law. Despite knowing 
of the need to contact a Utah attorney, plaintiff failed to do so until around the end of 
November 1994, two weeks after the birth and placement. (Bekker Afft, U 3, R. 188, 
Add. 34; Beltran Afft, H 16, R. 231; Beltran Dep. 40-46, 79-80.)6 
Q: So as far as you knew after that conversation she was still going ahead with the adoption? 
A: Yes. [Beltran Dep. 71.] 
6Regarding his contact with California attorneys following receipt of the October 27 letter, plaintiff 
testified: 
Q: So you received the letter from Social Sevices saying that Denise was going ahead with 
the adoption and you wanted to take action to stop the adoption? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did you contact an attorney? 
A: Not at this time. We had talked to a few down in California. 
Q: A few days after you received that [letter] you talked to an attorney? 
A: Yes. And they didn't know the laws over in Utah. 
Q: Did you talk to just one? 
A: No, we talked to three. 
Q: Three different attorneys? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did you retain any of them to help you? 
A: No. 
Q: Why? 
A: They didn't know the laws of Utah. . . . [Beltran Dep. 44-45.] 
Plaintiff also repeatedly asserts that, after receiving the October 27 notice from the Agency, he 
telephoned Beverly Bekker, the Agency representative, and that she hung up on him. However, in his 
deposition, plaintiff admitted that he never telephoned Beverly Bekker or anyone else at the Agency: 
Q: Did you ever talk on the phone with Beverly Bekker? 
A: No. 
Q: You never did? 
A: No. 
Q: Did you ever talk on the phone with anyone from LDS Social Services in Utah? 
6 
On November 14, 1994, Denise gave birth to a baby girl in a Utah County hospital. 
On November 17, 1994, Denise signed a Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption, 
transferring custody of the baby to the Agency, and the Agency placed the baby with the 
Adoptive Parents that same day. Upon returning to California the following week, Denise 
informed plaintiff that she had placed the child for adoption in Utah. The Agency confirmed 
the adoptive placement in a December 1994 letter responding to plaintiffs request for 
information. (Allan Afft, 1JU H-13, R. 210, Add. 12; Bekker Afft, UH 5-7, R. 187-88, 
Add. 34-35; Beltran Afft, 1JU 17-18, R. 231; Beltran Dep. 76-79; Verified Complaint, H 11, 
Exh. R, R. 1.) 7 
Plaintiff failed to register a claim of paternity with the Utah Department of Health 
prior to relinquishment of the child for adoption; in fact, plaintiff has never registered a claim 
of paternity with regard to Denise's baby in the State of Utah. (Bekker Afft, U 8, R. 187, 
Add. 35; Order, R. 287, Add. 2; Beltran Dep. 81.) 
Plaintiff commenced this action on January 11,1995, seeking custody of the child and 
damages. (R. 21.) Plaintiff subsequently stipulated to dismissal of his California paternity 
action. (R. 175.) On November 30, 1995, the district court granted defendants summary 
A: No. [Beltran Dep. 63.] 
7Regarding his knowledge of the adoption, plaintiff testified: 
Q: When did you learn the baby was placed for adoption? 
A: Once Denise-Fm not positive, I think it's when Denise got back she told me. 
Q: Now, that conversation with Denise was about, you said, about five days after the birth 
of the baby? 
A: Yes. 
Q: So that would have been in November when you learned that it had been placed? 
A: Yes. [Beltran Dep. 79.] 
7 
judgment in this case based on plaintiffs failure to comply with the Utah paternity 
registration statute, as construed and upheld by this Court in In re Adoption of W, 904 P.2d 
1113 (Utah App. 1995). (R. 287-88, Add. 1.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is an appropriate case for summary judgment, and plaintiff failed to argue to the 
contrary in the district court. Plaintiff has cited no material issue of fact. Any supposed 
dispute as to what was done or understood prior to October 1994 is rendered immaterial by 
plaintiffs own admission at that time that he knew Denise was in Utah placing the child for 
adoption. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because, given plaintiffs 
knowledge in October 1994, plaintiff could have registered his paternity by November 17, 
1994, but failed to register at all. 
Plaintiff concedes that he failed to register his paternity prior to Denise's 
relinquishment, as required by the registration statute. Moreover, the "impossibility 
exception" to timely registration cannot apply in this case because (1) it was possible for 
plaintiff to register prior to the relinquishment; (2) plaintiffs failure to register by that 
deadline was due to his own fault in failing to ascertain the Utah registration requirement; 
and (3) plaintiff, having failed to register at all, plainly failed to register within 10 days after 
it became possible. Utah law is clear that an unwed father must strictly comply with the 
statutory requirements to assert his paternal rights. Prior cases applying the impossibility 
exception are distinguishable from this case because plaintiff knew, at least 23 days before 
the relinquishment, that Denise was in Utah with the intent of placing the child for adoption. 
Furthermore, plaintiff is not entitled to a hearing on compliance with the registration statute, 
8 
because there is no evidence that it was impossible for him to register timely through no fault 
of his own. 
Plaintiff failed to argue the due process issue in the district court. In any event, in 
Adoption of W this Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of the registration statute and held 
that the 10-day rule satisfies due process. Moreover, the 10-day rule is fair and reasonable 
as applied in this case because plaintiff never registered, and if he had registered within 10 
days after it became possible, he could have contested the adoption. Because plaintiff failed 
to register, he is barred from contesting the adoption or asserting any interest in the child. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: PLAINTIFF HAS CITED NO MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT PRECLUDING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Plaintiff argues that there are material issues of fact precluding entry of summary 
judgment. (App. Br. 12-13.) However, plaintiff fails to cite even one such disputed fact. 
Moreover, plaintiff failed to make this argument in the district court and is, therefore, barred 
from raising it on appeal. E.g., James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987). 
In the district court, without arguing against summary judgment, plaintiff listed four 
supposedly "disputed material facts:" (1) whether plaintiff believed in May 1994 that Denise 
would place the baby for adoption; (2) whether the background information provided by 
plaintiff pertained to adoption; (3) whether Denise communicated with plaintiff by telephone 
from Utah; and (4) whether the Agency's October 27, 1994 letter "reaffirmed" that Denise 
was in Utah. (R. 258-59.) Again, plaintiff did not argue that those claimed disputes 
precluded summary judgment. Moreover, as defendants demonstrated in reply, none of those 
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four claimed disputes is material to the sole legal issue of whether timely registration of 
paternity was impossible, through no fault of plaintiff. (R. 274-78.) 
Plaintiff does not dispute the essential material facts in this case. He does not dispute 
that he learned of the pregnancy in May 1994; he knew of the planned adoption throughout 
the pregnancy; and he knew by at least the middle of October 1994, one month before the 
relinquishment, that Denise was in Provo, Utah. With that information, plaintiff could have 
contested the adoption by merely registering a claim of paternity in Utah prior to November 
17, 1994. Accordingly, any claimed dispute regarding what plaintiff believed in May 1994, 
or the purpose of the adoption papers in July 1994, or whether Denise informed plaintiff she 
was going to Utah in August 1994, or whether the two communicated by telephone thereafter 
is completely immaterial. All such facts are rendered immaterial by plaintiffs own admission 
in his October 25 California complaint that Denise "has moved to Utah and plans to release 
the child for adoption" (R. 125, emp. added.) With that information on October 25, if not 
earlier, plaintiff certainly could have registered a claim of paternity in Utah by November 17. 
Thus, plaintiffs own admission confirms the only material facts in this case. 
In summary, there is no factual dispute regarding plaintiffs ability to register a timely 
claim of paternity. 
POINT II: PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SATISFYTHE IMPOSSIBILITY EXCEPTION TO 
TIMELY REGISTRATION OF PATERNITY. 
A. Paternity Registration Requirement. 
The adoption statute in effect when this case arose provides that an unwed father may 
claim paternal rights in his newborn child only by timely registering a claim of paternity. 
Section 78-30-4.8(l)(a), Utah Code Ann. (1994 Supp.), states: 
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Any person who is the father or claims to be the father of a child born 
outside of marriage may file notice of his claim of paternity and of his 
willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability with the 
state registrar of vital statistics in the Department of Health. [Add. 43.] 
To be timely, the father's paternity registration must be filed before the child is 
relinquished for adoption. Section 78-30-4.8(2) provides: 
The notice may be filed prior to the birth of the child but must be filed 
prior to the time the child is relinquished to a licensed child placing 
agency . . . . [Id., emp. added.] 
Because of the vital importance of determining with promptness and finality the 
long-term care of the child, a father who fails to register timely is barred from filing any 
action to assert any interest in the child. As set forth in section 78-30-4.8(3): 
The Legislature finds that a certain degree of finality is necessary in order 
to facilitate the state's interest in expediting the adoption of young children 
and in protecting the rights and interests of the child, the birth mother, and 
the adoptive parents. Therefore, any putative father who fails to file his notice 
of paternity is barred from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to assert 
any interest in the child . . . . [Id., emp. added.] 
Furthermore, subsection (4) makes clear that a father who fails to register his 
paternity has no rights in relation to the adoption of the child: 
[F]ailure to file a notice of paternity shall be deemed to be a waiver and 
surrender of any right to notice of any hearing in any judicial proceeding for 
adoption of the child, and the consent of that person to the adoption of the child 
is not required. [Id., emp. added.] 
In accordance with these statutes, an unwed father who fails to register his claim of 
paternity prior to the child's relinquishment for adoption forfeits all paternal rights to the 
child, is barred from filing any action to assert any interest in the child, and has no right to 
contest the adoption of the child. See In re Adoption of W, 904 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah App. 
1995) (father who fails to register pursuant to section 78-30-4.8 "is explicitly barred from 
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objecting to the adoption petition"); Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 795 P.2d 637, 640 (Utah 
1990) (rights of unwed father are "automatically terminated" upon mother's adoptive 
relinquishment); Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199, 202 (Utah 1984) (father's rights 
are "surrendered pursuant to statute" by failure to register timely claim of paternity); Sanchez 
v. L.D.S. Social Services, 680 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1984) (a firm cutoff date for registration 
is essential, and the father's diligence and sincerity short of timely registration are 
unavailing).8 
Plaintiff concedes that he failed to comply with the foregoing registration requirement. 
(App. Br. 15.) Plaintiff not only failed to register a claim of paternity prior to Denise's 
relinquishment, he has never registered a claim of paternity. Therefore, plaintiff has forfeited 
his paternal rights, and this action is barred. In re Adoption of W, supra, 904 P.2d at 1120. 
B. Impossibility Exception. 
Plaintiff argues that he is exempt from the registration requirement by the terms of 
the statutory impossibility exception. (App. Br. 15.) However, the district court correctly 
ruled that plaintiff failed to satisfy the conditions of that exception. 
The so-called "impossibility exception" authorizes the court to recognize a late 
paternity registration if the father proves by "clear and convincing evidence" that it was 
The current adoption statute, effective May 1,1995, contains a similar paternity registration scheme. The 
unwed father of a newborn child can establish his paternal rights by filing with the Department of Health a 
notice of commencement of a paternity action prior to the mother's relinquishment of the child for adoption. 
U.C.A. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) (1995 Supp.). A father who fails to comply with the statute "is deemed to have 
waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child . . . and his consent to the adoption of the child is 
not required." Id., subsection (5). Accordingly, the legislative intent to require timely and definitive action 
by unwed fathers remains unchanged. 
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impossible for him to register timely through no fault of his own. Specifically, as set forth 
in 78-30-4.8(3), the unwed father must establish the following three conditions: 
(a) it was not possible for him to file a notice of paternity within the period 
of time specified in Subsection (2); 
(b) his failure to file a notice of paternity was through no fault of his own; 
and 
(c) he filed a notice of paternity within 10 days after it became possible for 
him to file. [Id., Add. 43.] 
This Court traced the legislative history and provided the correct interpretation of the 
impossibility exception in the recent case of In re Adoption of W, 904 P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 
1995). There, the unwed parents were Indiana residents, but the mother went to Nevada one 
month before the birth without notifying the father. The mother's family refused to disclose 
her location to the father. The mother gave birth in Nevada and relinquished the child to 
an agency for adoptive placement in Utah. Unaware of the mother's location or of the 
child's birth, the father commenced a paternity action in Indiana on the day after the birth. 
Two weeks later, the mother notified the father of the birth and pending Utah adoption. 
However, the father failed to register a claim of paternity in Utah until eight months later. 
Instead, his attorneys notified the adoptive parents of his opposition to adoption and filed 
an objection in the adoption proceeding. This Court held that the father's failure to register 
timely barred him from objecting to the adoption. Id. at 1120. Moreover, the Court rejected 
the argument of substantial compliance with the statute, observing that precise adherence to 
statutory requirements is mandated by both policy and precedent. Id. at 1121. Finally, the 
Court held that the impossibility exception did not apply because, even if timely registration 
was impossible through no fault of the father, he still failed to register within ten days after 
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it became possible, based on the mother's notice of the Utah adoption. The Court 
concluded: 
As a result of this failure to timely file his notice, [the father] forfeited the 
benefits of the statute. [Id.] 
Based on the analysis and holding in Adoption of W, it is evident that the three 
conditions for the impossibility exception are not satisfied in this case. 
1. Impossibility. Plaintiff has presented no evidence, clear and convincing or 
otherwise, demonstrating that timely registration of paternity was impossible. Plaintiff argues 
that timely registration was impossible because Denise left California without advising him 
and gave birth in Utah. (App. Br. 21.) As noted in the Statement of Facts, Denise maintains 
that she did inform plaintiff of her departure in August 1994, and plaintiff admitted in his 
deposition that he was informed prior to her departure. The record also shows 
correspondence between Denise and plaintiffs family in early October 1994, indicating that 
plaintiff knew Denise's Utah address. However, even if plaintiff was not informed of 
Denise's departure in August 1994, his own California complaint, signed October 25, 
concedes that he knew Denise had "moved to Utah and plans to release the child for 
adoption." (Add. 25.) Moreover, plaintiff mailed that complaint to Denise at her Provo, 
Utah address. Therefore, plaintiff admittedly knew Denise's location and intent at least 23 
days before she relinquished the child on November 17. Because plaintiff learned of Denise's 
location and intent within sufficient time to register in Utah, her supposed departure without 
notice did not render timely registration impossible. In re Adoption ofW, supra, 904 P.2d at 
1120-21; Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199, 207-08 (Utah 1984) (timely registration 
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was not impossible because the father had "ample advance notice of the expected time of 
birth and the fact that the mother intended to relinquish the child for adoption"). 
Plaintiff next argues that timely registration was impossible because no one advised 
him of the paternity registration requirement. (App. Br. 21.) However, the law does not 
require actual notice of the statutory requirements for establishing paternal rights. Sanchez 
v. L.D.S. Social Services, supra, 680 P.2d at 755. The only notice that is required to an 
out-of-state father is that the child is to be born in Utah and could be placed for adoption. 
Ellis v. Social Services Dept, 615 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980); In re Adoption of Baby Boy 
Doe, 111 P.2d 686, 690-91 (Utah 1986). Plaintiff admittedly knew that the child was to be 
born in Utah and that Denise planned to place the child for adoption. With that knowledge, 
the burden is on the father to learn of the Utah legal requirements to protect his rights. In 
re Adoption ofW, supra, 904 P.2d at 1121 (nonresident father must "strictly comply" with Utah 
law). Plaintiff contacted three different California attorneys who informed him that he 
needed a Utah attorney. Yet, plaintiff apparently ignored that advice and proceeded with 
a California action. However, filing a paternity action in the father's home state does not 
satisfy the Utah registration requirement. In re Adoption of W, supra, at 1115, 1120-21 
(father's Indiana paternity action held unavailing under Utah law). Thus, plaintiff cannot 
create impossibility by choosing to remain ignorant of Utah legal requirements. 
Finally, plaintiff claims that timely registration was impossible because he was not 
notified of the child's birth and relinquishment until the end of November 1994. (App. Br. 
22.) However, occurrence of the birth is not necessary for timely registration. As set forth 
in section 78-30-4.8(2), the father's claim of paternity "may be filed prior to the birth of the 
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child." (Emp. added.) The father is not required to wait for the birth. Moreover, if he waits 
for notice of the relinquishment, he is too late in any event. Id. Here, plaintiff had advance 
notice of the expected birth and planned adoption with sufficient time to register his 
paternity. Therefore, plaintiffs ignorance of the actual birth and relinquishment did not 
render timely registration impossible. 
In summary, timely registration was not impossible. 
2. Plaintiffs Fault Neither can plaintiff show that his failure to register prior to the 
relinquishment was through no fault of his own. Plaintiff argues that, upon learning of the 
impending Utah adoption, he "did everything he thought necessary to preserve and protect 
his rights." (App. Br. 23.) Plaintiff refers to his California paternity action, this subsequent 
Utah action, and his "manifested" intent to keep the baby. (Id.) However, while plaintiff 
may have done what he thought was necessary, he did not do what was required by law. 
Plaintiffs actions do not satisfy the Utah registration statute. In Adoption ofW, supra, 
the Indiana father commenced a paternity action in Indiana on the day after the birth, prior 
to the relinquishment and adoption petition in Utah. He subsequently filed an objection in 
the Utah adoption proceeding. However, this Court held that such legal actions avail nothing 
because they do not strictly comply with the registration statute. 904 P.2d at 1121. This 
Court cited Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, supra, in which the Utah Supreme Court 
rejected a paternity registration that was one day late, holding that "strict compliance with 
the adoption statutes is reasonable because of the nature of adoptions." Id. This Court also 
cited Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), in which the United States Supreme Court held 
that the filing of a paternity action was insufficient to satisfy a paternity registration statute, 
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even though the adoption court and all interested parties were aware of the father's action. 
The Lehr court explained: 
The legitimate state interests in facilitating the adoption of young children and 
having the adoption proceeding completed expeditiously that underlie the 
entire statutory scheme also justify a trial judge's determination to require all 
interested parties to adhere precisely to the procedural requirements of the 
statute. [Id. at 265, emp. added.] 
See also Burns v. Crenshaw, 733 P.2d 922 (Or. App. 1987) (unwed father's Washington 
paternity action did not satisfy the Oregon registration statute so as to qualify the father for 
notice of the Oregon adoption proceeding). Thus, plaintiffs legal actions and various 
manifestations of interest are inadequate to protect his rights. 
Plaintiffs own fault was in failing to contact a Utah lawyer, or other person with 
knowledge of the Utah registration requirement, in time to register a claim of paternity prior 
to the relinquishment. Plaintiff admittedly knew of the impending birth and relinquishment 
in Utah, and he was advised by three California attorneys of the need to contact a Utah 
attorney, yet he failed to do so until it was too late. Plaintiff attempts to blame Denise for 
his failure, asserting that he had obtained a California restraining order against her 
departure. (App. Br. 25.) However, the supposed restraining order was not mailed to 
Denise until more than two months after she had already left California. Moreover, it had 
no effect on the child because the child was not yet born. In any event, the supposed order, 
by its own terms, had no effect until Denise received "personal service" or signed the waiver 
of service, neither of which occurred. (R. 195.) Finally, plaintiff blames the Agency for not 
advising him of his legal obligations. (App. Br. 25.) However, the Agency's duty was to 
Denise, the Agency's client. The Agency has no duty to advise an unwed father how he can 
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defeat the adoption plan of the client-unwed mother; to do so would violate the duty of 
confidentiality and loyalty owed to the mother, as well as the mother's right of privacy. 
Moreover, plaintiff has cited no authority for such a repugnant proposition. 
In summary, plaintiff had sufficient information to protect his own rights, and he 
failed to do so. Because he himself bears the fault for failing to register his paternity, he 
cannot satisfy the impossibility exception. 
3. Registration Within 10 Days After It Became Possible. Finally, plaintiff cannot 
show that he actually registered a claim of paternity within 10 days after it became possible 
to do so. Even if plaintiff could establish that timely registration was impossible through no 
fault of his own, he would still have to show that he registered within 10 days after it became 
possible. Adoption ofWy supra, 904 P.2d at 1121 (even if impossibility and lack of fault are 
established, father "still must file his notice of paternity within ten days after it becomes 
possible for him to file"). But plaintiff admittedly has never registered a claim of paternity, not 
within 10 days after it became possible, not ever. If registration prior to the relinquishment 
was impossible, then it certainly became possible when Denise personally informed plaintiff 
of the completed adoption near the end of November 1994. See Adoption of W, supra, 904 
P.2d at 1121 (concluding that registration became possible at least when the father was 
notified of the pending Utah adoption). In any event, a determination of precisely when 
registration became possible in this case is rendered unnecessary by plaintiffs failure to 
register at all. By that failure, plaintiff has forfeited the benefits of the impossibility 
exception statute. Id. 
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Plaintiff attempts to justify his failure to register by arguing that this Court's decision 
in Adoption of W is wrong, that registration is not necessary to apply the impossibility 
exception, and that an unwed father may, by any means of his choosing, "come forward within 
a reasonable time after the baby's birth." (App. Br. 26-28.) However, this is simply a vain 
claim that plaintiff is above the law and should be permitted to ignore the registration 
statute. Obviously, there is no legal support for this claim. To the contrary, the law is well 
established that an unwed father of a newborn child has only an inchoate right, or 
"opportunity interest" with regard to the child, and that such right or interest becomes vested 
and enforceable only by strict adherence to statutory requirements. Accordingly, that 
provisional right is forfeited or surrendered by failing to comply with statutory requirements. 
E.g., Lehr v. Robertson, supra, 463 U.S. at 263-65; Wells v. Children's Aid Society, supra, 681 
P.2d at 202-03, 206-07; Adoption of W} supra, 904 P.2d at 1116-20. Even in Ellis, cited by 
plaintiff, the father "came forward" by filing a statutory claim of paternity. As stressed by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, supra: 
It is no too harsh to require that those responsible for bringing children into 
the world outside the established institution of marriage should be required 
either to comply with those statutes that accord them the opportunity to assert 
their parental rights or to yield to the method established by society to raise 
children in a manner best suited to promote their welfare. [680 P.2d at 756, 
emp. added.] 
Plainly, to allow unwed fathers to "come forward" by any means and at any time of 
their choosing would introduce chaos, confusion, uncertainty, and delay into the adoption 
process. Sound public policy requires strict compliance with prescribed statutory procedures. 
If an unwed father could choose any convenient means of communicating his interest and 
commitment, from verbal assurances and phone calls to letters and legal actions, disputes 
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would invariably arise over whether a communication occurred and what was intended. Such 
informal communications are also subject to denial or misrepresentation by other parties. 
Informal commitments can easily change or be withdrawn and are therefore difficult to verify 
and enforce. If adoption agencies were required to delay adoptions while attempting to 
locate and identify committed parties and determine the veracity of conflicting and changing 
claims, children would languish in foster care, the privacy of the mother would be violated, 
and adoptive parents would lose interest. To avoid such results and facilitate the adoption 
process, the Legislature has provided one clear, definitive, and unmistakable means of 
demonstrating legal commitment to an out-of-wedlock child, and that is through the timely 
registration of a claim of paternity with the Utah Department of Health. See, e.g., Swayne 
v. L.D.S. Social Services, 795 P.2d 637, 641 (Utah 1990); Wells v. Children's Aid Society, supra, 
at 203, 206-07; Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, supra, at 755-56. 
In summary, plaintiff has failed to satisfy the three conditions for application of the 
impossibility exception to timely registration. 
C. Cases Prior to Statutory Impossibility Exception, 
Plaintiff relies on Ellis v. Social Services, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), and In re 
Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 111 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986), to support application of the statutory 
impossibility exception. However, these two cases were decided prior to the impossibility 
statute and were based on constitutional rather than statutory grounds. In any event, the two 
cases are easily distinguishable from the present case. 
In Ellis, the unwed parents were both residents of California, where the father 
expected the child to be born. Just before the child's birth, the mother came to Utah without 
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notifying the father. Here, the mother gave birth, declared the father "unknown," and 
relinquished the child for adoption. The father learned of the mother's actions and 
registered his paternity in Utah two weeks after the relinquishment. Despite the late 
registration, the Supreme Court held that the registration may be deemed timely if it was 
"impossible for the father to file the required notice of paternity prior to the statutory bar, 
through no fault of his own." 615 P.2d at 1256. Because lack of knowledge of where the birth 
was to occur may render timely registration impossible, the Court remanded for a hearing on 
whether the father could reasonably have expected the child to be born in Utah. Id. 
The basis for impossibility in Ellis does not exist in this case because plaintiff 
admittedly knew, at least 23 days before the relinquishment, that Denise was in Utah, where 
she planned to deliver and relinquish the child for adoption. Even if plaintiff disputes being 
notified of Denise's departure for Utah, or communicating with Denise after her arrival in 
Utah, he cannot dispute his own allegation in the California complaint that he knew where 
Denise was and what she was doing. The Agency's formal notice of October 27, confirming 
to plaintiff that Denise was in Utah planning to relinquish the child for adoption, was sent 
for the very purpose of avoiding the situation in Ellis. Moreover, the father in Ellis registered 
his paternity at the first opportunity, while plaintiff did not. Because plaintiff knew Denise 
was in Utah placing the child for adoption, and yet never registered his paternity, Ellis is 
distinguishable and provides no support for plaintiffs claim of impossibility. See Sanchez v. 
L.D.S. Social Services, supra, 680 P.2d at 755 n.l ("declining] to expand the holding in Ellis 
beyond the type of factual situation involved in that case"). 
21 
Baby Boy Doe is also distinguishable. There, the father knew the mother was in Utah, 
but was misled by the mother's statements that she would keep the baby and marry the 
father. The father did not learn of the adoption until one day after the relinquishment, and 
he registered a claim of paternity the very next day. 717 P.2d at 687-88. Based on the 
mother's misrepresentations, the Supreme Court concluded that the father did not know of 
the need to protect his rights through earlier registration; therefore, his late registration was 
deemed timely. Id. at 691. By contrast, in the present case plaintiff alleges no 
misrepresentation regarding the adoption plan. Plaintiff knew of the possibility of adoption 
from the third month to the final week of the pregnancy, and Denise never told the plaintiff 
that she would not place the child for adoption. Therefore, unlike the father in Baby Boy 
Doe, plaintiff knew of the need to protect his rights, and yet failed to register at all. 
Accordingly, neither does Baby Boy Doe support plaintiffs claim of impossibility. See Swayne 
v. L.D.S. Social Services, supra, 795 P.2d at 643 (timely registration is not impossible where 
the father was not misled and "should have been aware of the need to protect his parental 
rights"). 
Accordingly, plaintiff has cited no authority to excuse him from timely registration. 
D. Evidentiary Hearing. 
Finally, plaintiff argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to establish that 
timely registration was impossible. (App. Br. 20-22.) However, this is but another way of 
challenging the summary judgment, which, by definition, is entered on the undisputed facts 
without a trial. Plaintiff relies on Ellis for the proposition that he is entitled to a hearing to 
show that he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute. 615 P.2d 
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at 1256. However, in Wells v. Children's Aid Society, supra, the Supreme Court expressly 
rejected the notion that an evidentiary hearing is required in every case: 
[T]he "reasonable opportunity" referred to in the quoted sentence [from Ellis] 
only applies "in such a case," i.e., when it is first shown that it was "impossible" 
for the father to file "through no fault of his own." Otherwise, the need to 
prove in each adoption case that the unwed father . . . had a "reasonable 
opportunity" to file the required notice of paternity would frustrate the 
statute's purpose to facilitate secure adoptions by early clarification of status. 
[681 P.2d at 208.] 
Because plaintiff has not shown that timely registration was impossible through no fault of 
his own, his status was properly decided as a matter of law, without an evidentiary hearing. 
See, e.g., Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, supra, 795 P.2d at 643 (affirming summary judgment 
against the father for lack of timely registration). 
In summary, plaintiff has provided no factual or legal support for his argument that 
he should be entirely excused from registering his paternity on the basis of the statutory 
impossibility exception. Therefore, summary judgment was proper. 
POINT III: THE PATERNITY REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT DOES NOT 
VIOLATE DUE PROCESS. 
Plaintiff presented no analysis or authority in the district court for his current claim 
that the paternity registration statute violates due process. Therefore, plaintiff is precluded 
from raising the due process issue on appeal. See, e.g., James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 
(Utah App. 1987). In any event, the due process argument has no merit, and was expressly 
rejected by this Court in Adoption of W, supra. 
A. Ten-Day Filing Requirement. 
Plaintiff concedes that the requirement of filing a claim of paternity satisfies all due 
process requirements, as held in Wells v. Children's Aid Society, supra, and other cases. 
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Plaintiff objects only to the condition in the impossibility exception that the claim be filed 
within 10 days after it becomes possible. Plaintiff argues that the 10-day period is 
unreasonable and serves no useful purpose. (App. Br. 28-31.) However, in Adoption ofW, 
supra, this Court approved and applied the ten-day period "as the Reasonable time' period 
described in Ellis for the putative father to file his notice of paternity when the other two 
conditions are met." 904 P.2d at 1119. Even if the other conditions had been met, the father 
in Adoption of W "forfeited the benefits of the statute" by failing to register within ten days 
after it became possible. Id. at 1121. Regarding due process, this Court observed that the 
registration statute has "repeatedly withstood due process challenges" and "has always been 
found to be constitutional on its face." Id. This Court also expressly upheld the 10-day 
provision: 
The requirement that [the father] register his notice of paternity with the State 
of Utah within ten days after it became possible for him to do so, while short, 
is not impermissibly short. The state has a legitimate and compelling interest 
in "expediting the adoption of young children and in protecting the rights and 
interests of the child, the birth mother, and the adoptive parents, and therefore 
may require that biological fathers, who are in the best position to protect their 
own rights, adhere strictly to the requirements of its adoption laws. [Id. at 
1122, emp. added, citations omitted.] 
Thus, the 10-day rule satisfies due process. 
B. Application of 10-Day Rule, 
Plaintiff argues that the 10-day rule violates due process as applied to this case 
because it serves no purpose in this case. (App. Br. 31-34.) However, plaintiff misconstrues 
the purpose of the 10-day requirement, misreads the registration statute, and attempts to 
apply the 10-day rule to an extreme hypothetical situation that is far removed from the facts 
of this case. 
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The purpose of registration is to allow the adoption agency or adoptive parents to 
check in one central place, prior to accepting a child for adoption or filing an adoption 
petition, to determine conclusively whether the father intends to assert his paternal rights. 
See U.C.A. § 78-30-4.8(2). This allows the child and adoptive parents to avoid the pain of 
separation after bonding has begun and relationships have formed. See Wells v. Children's 
Aid Society, supra, 681 P.2d at 206. An additional search of the paternity registry is made 
prior to finalizing the adoption to verify that the father is not contesting the adoption. 
Section 78-30-4.8(5). At both stages of inquiry, the agency or adoptive parents also attempt 
to determine whether any grounds for the impossibility exception may exist, such as the 
father's ignorance of the mother's location, as in Ellis, or his ignorance of the proposed 
adoption, as in Baby Boy Doe, If, as in this case, the father knows of the mother's location 
and planned adoption, the father has no excuse for not registering, and the adoption may 
proceed. If the father may not be aware of the mother's location and adoption plan, then 
he is notified of that information, as was done with plaintiff in this case. If the father fails 
to register within 10 days after receiving that information (or by the date of the 
relinquishment, whichever is longer), then the adoption may proceed. Accordingly, the 
10-day rule provides a definite period of time in which a notified father must act, and after 
which his objections are barred. 
The 10-day rule served its purpose in this case. While the record shows that plaintiff 
had sufficient information to protect his rights by at least mid-October 1994, the Agency sent 
its October 27 letter to plaintiff out of an abundance of caution to remove any possible basis 
for a claim of impossibility. If plaintiff had registered his paternity within 10 days after that 
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notice, he could have contested the adoption. In fact, because the relinquishment did not 
occur until November 17, plaintiff actually had 21 days from that notice to register. Because 
plaintiff failed to register by either deadline, his action is barred. 
Plaintiffs hypothetical case of a father registering after the placement, but within 10 
days after registration became possible, has no similarity to this case. However, in such a 
case, the registration would still be noted prior to entry of the decree (pursuant to 
78-30-4.8(5)) and would still entitle the father to contest the adoption, despite the placement. 
But if, as in this case, earlier registration was possible, then a late registration is ineffective. 
If, as plaintiff claims (albeit without explanation or support), his registration was not possible 
until January 1995, then a registration within 10 days thereafter would have been effective 
to contest the adoption, despite the placement. U.C.A. §§ 78-30-4.7 and -4.10. A 
registration at that point would be ineffective only if earlier registration was possible. Thus, 
in this case, as plaintiff concedes, any registration after November 17 would be ineffective, 
not because the child had already been placed, and not because the registration would go 
unnoticed, but simply because earlier registration was possible. In any event, on these facts, 
plaintiff has difficulty challenging the 10-day registration period when he has failed to register 
at all, ever. Because plaintiff has never registered, he has no standing to argue that the 
deadline for registration is unreasonable; for plaintiff not only missed the deadline, he totally 
ignored it. 
In summary, plaintiff has provided no legal basis or authority for his belated argument 
on due process. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the district court's order of summary 
judgment in favor of defendants. 
Respectfully submitted this *Z£r day of May, 1996. 
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SERVICES, an Agency of the Church of : 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; and : Judge Guy R. Burningham 
JOHN DOES I through V, : 
Defendants. : 
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of 
defendants Denise Allan and LDS Social Services. The adoptive parents, who joined the 
action as Doe defendants, joined in defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff 
subsequently filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and requested oral argument 
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on the motions. The Court, having reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of 
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby orders as follows: 
1. There is no material issue of fact. 
2. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because (a) plaintiff 
has made no efforts to file a notice of claim of paternity with the Utah Department of 
Health; (b) plaintiff is barred from asserting any interest in the child and has no right of 
consent to the child's adoption, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.8 (1994 Supp.); and (c) the 
recent case of In re Adoption of W., 275 U.A.R. 20 (Utah App. 1995), is directly on point 
in rejecting plaintiffs legal claims. 
3. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
4. Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
5. Plaintiffs request for oral argument is denied, pursuant to Rule 4-501(c)(b), 
Code of Jud. Admin., because "the issue . . . governing the granting [of summary 
judgment] has been authoritatively decided." 
Dated this So day of November,
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
' * 
.*V# '*> 
MARIO G. BELTRAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENISE ALLAN; LDS SOCIAL 
SERVICES, an agency of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; and JOHN 
DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. 950400021 
RULING 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration (1995), on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court has 
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, and upon being advised in the 
premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. Plaintiff has made no efforts to file notice of his claim of paternity with the 
Utah Department of Health. 
2. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4.13 (Supp. 1995) and because In the 
Matter of the Adoption of W.. 275 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (1995), is directly on point, 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
3. Plaintiffs Cross-motion for Summary Judgment is therefore DENTED. 
/// 
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4. Pursuant to Rule 4-501 (3)(c)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
(1995), Plaintiffs request for oral argument is DENIED; "the issue . . . governing the 
granting [of summary judgment] has been authoritatively decided." 
Counsel for Defendants is to prepare an order consistent with the terms of this ruling 
and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court 
for signature. 
Dated this / / day of November, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: DAVTD M. McCONKIE 
MERRILL F. NELSON 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104 
ROBERT L. MOODY 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
Mario G. Beltran, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v* 
Denise Allan; LDS Social 
Services, an Agency of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints; and John 
Does 1 through V, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
For failure of appellant to file the docketing statement 
within the time permitted by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
9(a), which time expired on January 19, 1996, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, See Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 3(a); provided, however, that if the 
docketing statement is submitted within ten (10) days from the 
date hereof, the appeal shall be thereby reinstated without 
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COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Mario G. Beltran, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Denise Allan; LDS Social 
Services, an agency of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints; and John 
Does I through V, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
TO THE ABOVE PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
A docketing statement has been filed with the Court of 
Appeals in the above-captioned case. This case is being 
considered for summary affirmance, pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 10(e), on the ground that the case is 
governed by In re Adoption of Wr 275 Utah Adv. Rep. 2 0 (Utah App. 
1995). In lieu of a brief, each party shall filea memorandum, 
not to exceed ten pages, explaining why summary disposition 
should, or should not, be granted by the court. Failure to 
respond may result in the granting of this motion. 
An original and four copies of the memorandum should be 
filed with the clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals on or before 
February 20, 199 6. 
DATED this / ^ d a y of February, 1996. 
SUA SPONTE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Case No. 960079-CA 
000007 
F 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Mario B. Beltran, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
v. 
Denise Allan, LDS Social 
Services, an Agency of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints; and John 
Does I through V, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
MAR 1 H 1996 
COURT OF APPEALS 
ORDER 
Case No. 960079-CA 
This matter is before the court on its own motion for 
summary disposition. Having reviewed and considered memoranda 
filed by the parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for 
summary disposition is denied and that the issues raised by 
appellant are deferred until plenary presentation and 
consideration of the case. Appellant's opening brief shall be 
filed with the clerk of the court on or before April 30, 1996. 
Dated this /(/ day of March, 1996 
FOR THE COURT: 
Judruh M. Billings, Judg 
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David M. McConkie (A2154) 
Merrill F. Nelson (A3841) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Denise Allan and LDS Social Services 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARIO G. BELTRAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENISE ALLAN; LDS SOCIAL 
SERVICES, an Agency of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; and 
JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DENISE ALLAN 
Case No. 950400021 
Judge Guy R. Burningham 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
:ss. 
I, Denise Allan, hereby depose and affirm under oath as follows: 
000009 
1. I am a defendant in the above-entitled action, and I have personal knowledge 
of the matters set forth herein. 
2. I am 20 years of age, and I have never been married. I was residing with 
my parents in the State of California when I began dating Mario G. Beltran in 1993. 
3. In March 1994, I informed Mario that I was approximately one-month 
pregnant and that he was the father. I subsequently learned and informed Mario that the 
baby was due in approximately November 1994. On multiple occasions after learning of 
my pregnancy, we discussed our options, including adoption. After careful consideration 
of all the circumstances, I decided that adoption in an established two-parent family would 
be best for the baby. 
4. In approximately May 1994, I stopped dating Mario and informed him that 
I had decided to place the baby for adoption. After that time, in frequent discussions with 
Mario regarding the planned adoption, I reaffirmed my adoption plan and never told 
Mario that I would not place the baby for adoption. 
5. In approximately June 1994, I contacted LDS Social Services in California 
regarding placing my baby for adoption in Utah. In July 1994, I requested Mario to 
complete a background information form given to me by LDS Social Services to be used 
in placing the baby for adoption. He completed the form, and I later delivered the form 
-2-
OOOOIO 
to LDS Social Services in Utah. A true and correct copy of that completed form is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
6. On or about August 15, 1994,1 left the State of California to reside with my 
aunt in Provo, Utah, where I planned to complete my pregnancy and place the baby for 
adoption. After arriving in Utah, I contacted the Provo office of LDS Social Services 
("Agency") to plan and arrange for the adoptive placement of my baby. My counselor was 
Beverly R. Bekker. I identified Mario G. Beltran as the father of my baby. 
7. Prior to leaving California, I informed Mario that I was going to Utah to 
complete my pregnancy and place the baby for adoption. He accused me of being selfish 
and of leaving because I was embarrassed to be carrying his baby, which was not true. 
8. Around the first part of October 1994, I called Mario by phone from Utah 
to obtain his mailing address so I could mail a letter to his mother. I told him that I was 
living with my aunt in Provo, Utah. I thereafter sent a letter to Mario's mother regarding 
my progress and adoption plan. While in Utah, prior to the birth, I received two letters 
from Mario's mother at my Provo, Utah address. A true and correct copy of the October 
17, 1994 letter is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
9. On November 7, 1994, I received a copy of Mario's California paternity 
complaint and related documents by certified mail addressed to me at my Utah address. 
A true and correct copy of those documents is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
-3-
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10. Upon receiving the California complaint from Mario, I called Mario by 
phone and expressed to him that I was surprised and disappointed by his action. I 
reaffirmed my decision that adoption was best for the baby and told him that I had 
selected an adoptive family and was proceeding with the adoption. 
11. On November 14, 1994, I gave birth to a baby girl in a Utah County 
hospital. This is the baby that is the subject of this action. 
12. On November 17, 1994, I signed a Relinquishment and Consent to 
Adoption, transferring legal custody of the baby to the Agency for the purpose of placing 
the baby for adoption. A true and correct copy of this document is attached hereto as 
Exhibit D. 
13. On or about November 25, 1994,1 returned to California, where I presently 
reside with my parents and attend college. 
14. I still desire that my baby be adopted by the family with whom she was 
placed by the Agency. However, if for any reason the adoption is not permitted to be 
completed, I desire to retain custody of the child. 





On this J2 /^ day of September, 1995, before me, the undersigned notary, 
personally appeared DENISE ALLAN, who signed the preceding document in my 
presence and who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is voluntary and the 
document truthful. 
OFFICIAL NOTARY SEAL $ 
JAN SHELLHART ft 
Notary Public — California jl 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY t 
My Co mm Expires OCT 17,1995 L 
J*£ -<^w >^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at /&,r/!L^ (?CL 




B A C K G R O U N D I N F O R M A T I O N 
(Birth Father) EXHIBIT A 
^ ^ This BACKGROUND INFORMATION form is designed to provide you and us with a tool wherein 
gniiicant social and medical information about your child's heritage is collected. If you plan adoption for 
our child, the identifying information you supply will be kept confidential. General information will be 
lared with your child's new family. If you have chosen to raise this child, you may wish to use this form 
) preserve information about yourself and the child's mother for future use. 
You will notice that various types of information are included in this form. The agency will need 
)ine of tills material in choosing the most suitable home for your child and to share background information 
1 tii the child's new family. The medical information, in particular, is asked for the purpose of early 
bareness, identification and treatment of future conditions your child may develop. We urge you to keep 
e agency informed of health problems you, your parents, your brothers or sisters, or your future children 
ight develop. 
Perhaps die most important purpose of tills information will be to answer questions your child may 
Lve about you. We have included questions of physical appearance, interests, talents and education, 
uestions have been included to help your child understand, your placement decision. Please feel free to 
elude additional information that you may feel is important. Some of the specific facts asked may not be 
rai]able or known. 
This BACKGROUND INFORMATION is limited in many ways. It indicates a sketch of you at this 
ne. Changes that may be of major importance to your child will occur to you in the future; therefore, 
Iditional information can be added at any future time by contacting your adoption agency or your worker. 
The accuracy and care that you use in completing this form will be greatly appreciated by your child, 
e new family, and the agency. Thank you for your help. 
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION 
(Information in shaded area will not be released) 
Same of Falhcn 
MfiR\Q &RCc.\fr fi^T<?fl;u 
Dale of Birth: PUce of Birth: 
Proem Add,o,: Sirct C , » C o u n , ) r ^ *7 
Permanent Addxas; Street City County Sut* ' Zip 
/7 V&t rV/>>r f:,7,r.^ rr.A'r UU^tS. /£. C .fr, Q^So 
000014 
NON-IDEN . VING BACKGROUND IN; OlATION 
(Please use black ink) 
Child's birth date or due date: 
nformation Provided by: 
Sex of child (if known): _^£mF\LG_ 
Date: 
(SLIIX rtUuonihip to child only, i.e. mother, fithtr. etc) 
Nationality Background (e.g., German, English, etc)- U \ s p ^ A ) g r 
facial Background(s), (e.g., white, black, etc.): Ofl-DujfVJ 
f Native American (Indian), what Tribe(s): 
Where enrolled: 
)ESCRIPTION: 
leight: S~1Q Usual weight: ( ( ^ Q Hair color: Yxicx^fv 
'ompiexion: Fair Medium Olive 
Eye Color: bf? ftojrJ 
Dark * Right/left handed ^oVy}-
hysical features (e.g., big/small boned, long/short limbed', muscular, etc.): fHCcM0ry>i—D^\ *Q 
/hat are your interests/taients/hobbies: ^ ^ r P f t H / fooVt*?/^ 

















ast grade completed: \X Presently in school: Yes a No ^ Avg. grades: £ O g ft-P^e>V^ 
uture plans for schooling: .— 
ubjects interested in: U rvW.£ r o v i e r t tr>.^glr -fcc? p s l l r p , &>K ^ F H i r ^ ' R e l d 
xtracurricular activities: _ — • — 
Jiy school-related problems or challenges: f\fcA^ 
additional training: P^Tl^-
IMPLOYMENT HISTORY: 
lurrent occupation: 9-os, (°H* ScMUrvo Cc/np<v^ Previous occupation: 
Military service: Yes a N o V Branch of service: 




























































/ I 3 
1 Y« 



















j 0 « u ^ - c c x * ^ ^ ^ ^ s ^ 
What kind? Age at onset? Part of body? 
How long used? How often? 
• ; — ^ A u t o h J| 
Specify type: 
Specify type; age at diagnosis; medications: 
[ A * 
Age al onset? Treatment? Hospitalization? 
Age at onset? Frequency0 Treatment? 



























-Muscular Dystrophy 1 
-Multiple Sclerosis 
-Cerebral PaJsv 
-Other paraJysis or 
crippling disorders 1 
Rheumatic Fever: 1 
Sexually Transmitted Diseases: 1 
-Gonorrhea 1 
-Syphilis 




















































Age and outcome; 
J ^ V « C ^ - Q S C ( \ 
Type of education? Medication? 
Specify type: 
Specify type: 
Any diagnosis or cause? Hospitalized? 
What pan of body? Both sides? How severe? 
Did heart murmur result? 
f\0(\+~ M t c ^ S x ^ ^ d 
n/x* \ rue 
000017 
you wish to add a more detailed biot.-pf sketch of yourself in the file, please f, J
 D do so at anytime. This would be 
(formation shared with your child and the aaopti\e parents of your child. It would give them a more personal understanding of 
DU as a person. (Please use back of form if you need additional space.) ° 
Earliest recollections/memories or experiences from your growing up years. 
0^ h f l ^ f ] , X h ^ ^ ©(f££\en<L^. evl«tf.<^*v^ 4 + ^ h / ^ o > ^
 #ThM- m ^ ^ t - O o * \ ^ 
U5<UA /nu p A ^ c ^ ^ ^ too-*- S A \ ^ « ^ Y S CcV ^ ( ^ ^ ^ toV *^V 9/lA"d p^men-K. nlooV rn-onr^rt.i'el 
Describe your childhood and feelings about parents, brother and sisters. How do you think your earlier life has helped make 
you the person you are? 
u v ^ x u ^ cfou^ ^ r>,0 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ e ^ ^ ^ e b U i baV h<L voool^ ^ s 
Accomplishments during your life (include school, church or other events you are proud of): 
A*cVfiex \f> <v^roc o ^ s ^ ^ t w ^ &V)^  ^ k s e p U i e m . ' 
Goals or hopes for the future: 
One. qofA \5 i-o q e ^ tyi^'bas^ j e b X CjqnD Vo Scppor tV r ^ t M - j ^ o A*d t o <7 r^e. V^*. 
Do you have any health concerns you would specifically wish to explain in detail? 
ilone 
Briefly describe your work or school, sharing the enjoyment you derive from it and importance it has in your life. If you have 
not decided or you arc not yet working toward a career goal, describe your thoughts about working. 
9C ^ ^ ^ ^ i o c o l ^ e fl^ ^fttal" ^XL S-he. top. 
What are your feelings about religion (religious preference, church activity, positions held, etc.)? 
000018 
8 
J- V '—} 
Ou'/n-eo 
IUJJU<- uuvT JKJU jci. JTUUI^ CJI <t j — umers see you. 
I. What is the most important thing, either positive or negative, that you have had to handle in your life? What was the impact 
of it on your life and did it affect your present outlook on life? 
0. What is your current relationship with your child's birth mother? 
fr^by u ^ ^ i d JT d o ^ W - cJo A s e ^ M £ ^ Y * e . r > 7 o ^ e ^ > U n , ^ J ^
 / + W / £ « " * h ^ 
' < F ^ , B v j V - X ^ r x w ^ C) x CCgn ^vrfc W \ e . /w*s*\eru. 5 ^ s h e n ^ c i s /V - f ^ J y b a | . 
UohtvV / ^ l£ Atvi
 m v^ -C^^w^ ta> <U~>c. b a b ^ c o ^ . r^z_-e A r ^ , ] ^ 
1. Indicate below your reasons for making a placement plan for your child. 
l. Indicate below your preferences, if any, regarding the selection of an adoptive family. 
DDITIONAL INFORMATION: 
st any geographic areas to avoid in placing the child for adoption: 
there any non-identifying information you do not want shared with the adoptive family or child/adult? 
jndcrstand that non-identifying information, other than what I have stated above, may be shared with the adoptive family or 

















/ - ^ ^ C^J^AM. 
^ 2 ^ 








•• / J ; V'rt'i 
ST. 
r#^ 







^ i ^ _ 
'-C^x^^ 
j&t^L c^Z 4 £t&^ 
lO-Gl*. 
^ ? l _ 
°yr Jt^-> 
000021 
fr Mr^- & 
Julia Word How c .= \ 
&n i ^ e . 
. . . I " " ' - ll,,lMl,.l.ll,.ll,.nlH!, ll!.l.l.. llMl..ll.!..l. l..lllln. 
000022 
* - * LEGAL SECRETARY 
43770 N. 43770 15TH. S T . E 
LANCASTER, CA 93534 
November j , iy?t 
Denise Allan 
281 East 2950 North 
Provo, UT 84604 
Re: Complaint to Establish a Paternal Relationship 
Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. PF000505 
Dear Ms. Allan: 
Please find enclosed a copy of the Complaint to Establish a 
Paternal Relationship that Mr. Beltran has filed in this action 
wherein he is requesting custody of the child not yet born. 
Please be advised that the summons states that you must file 
an answer in the Court here within 3 0 days from date of service, or 
Mr. Beltran will get his judgment of paternity by default. 
Please find enclosed a Notice of Acknowledgment and Receipt 
that you need to sign and return to my office -so that it may be filed with the court. 
By signing the uNotice of Acknowledgment and Receipt" you are 
not agreeing to anything, you are just saying that you received the 
paperwork and that a marshall or process server does not have to 
serve you. 
Please return the "Notice of Acknowledgment and Receipt" 
signed and dated where Indicated by the x's in the enclosed, self-
addressed envelope. 
I am not an attorney. I do not represent Mario, and am acting 
only as a typing service in this matter. Mario has consulted with 
an attorney and is going to pursue his legal rights regarding the 
child. 
Carol Pauley 
enc. as stated 
000023 
T Ofl PARTY WITHOUT ATTOflHEV IftMJm iflOAaaan*) 
0 G. BELTRAN 
7 CENTURION WAY 
US, CA 91350 
:TFOR m,,*) PLAINTIFF IN PRO PER 
TELEPHONE NO 





IOR COURT OP CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
rRfETACoaess 9 1 1 FIRST STREET 
JUNCACDfi£S3 S A M E 
rwoziPcooe




 NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT 
PLAINTIFF: MARIO G. BELTRAN 








COMPLAINT TO ESTABUSH PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP 
(Unrform Parentage Act) 
REQUEST FOR ORDER FOR \jgj CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION 
I | CHILD SUPPORT 
cxs£«uua£2: PFnnnno: i
lalntiff brings this action to determine whether a parent and child relationship exists between 
name)' MARIO G. BELTRAN and the following children: 
( | Child's name Date of Dlrth Age 
) 1 X la child who Is not yet born. 
| An application for an order prohibiting domestic vioienca under the Uniform Parentage Act is attached, 
("he court has Jurisdiction over the defendant because the defendant 
1 X 1 resides in this state. 
1 X \ had sexual intercourse in this state that resulted in conception of the children listed In Item 1. 
other (specify): 
fha action Is brought In this county because 
i. (" X l the child resides or Is found In the county. 
o \ | a parent Is deceased and proceedings for administration of the estate have been or could be started in the county 
Plaintiff Is 
a. I | the mother. b. I X I the father. 
c I ) the child or the child's personaf representative (speedy court and date of appointment). 
d.C5]otnar(spec//yj: Fa ther wishes t e s t i n g t o determine 
Plaintiff claims if he is the father. 
defendant Is the child's parent 
defendant, who is the child's parent, has failed to support the child. 
(name): has furnished or Is furnishing the following reasonable 
expenses of pregnancy, blrtn, education, or support for which the defendant as parent of the child is obligated. 




d. ( J other (specify); 
ira tawkfng an order rognrdlng custody or visitation 0/ minor chlldr$nf chack lt$m 7 a or 7b. 
a LXj Each child named In Item la Is presently living with [ j £ j plaintiff I [defendant 
at (address optional) C h i l d d u e N o v e m b e r 2 3 , 1 9 9 4 
and during tne last five years has lived In no state other than California and wltn no parson other than plaintiff or defendant 
or botn Plaintiff has not participated in any litigation or proceeding In any state concerning custody ot these children 
Plaintiff has no information or any pending custody proceeding or of any parson not a party to this proceeaing who has 
physical custody or claims to have custody or visitation rights concerning thase children 
b ( I A completed Declaration Under Uniform Custody of Minors Act Is attached. Cf you have not checked item 7a. you 
must attach tfys declaration ) 
ilT\ff<(Name): MARIO G. BELTR. / ~ ~T ' ' " " ;—i 
lOAUT(Name): DENISE ALLAN J _ ^ ^ 
r eques t s the cour t to make the determinat ions ind icated below. 
RENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP 
t x \ Defendant I x I Plaintiff is the parent of the children listed in item 1. 
I I Other (specify): 
U CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION 
a. | x I Cus tody I request the following custody orders (specify): 
Sole legal and physical custody of the minor child if tests determine 
the child is his biological child. 
b- I I Visitation (Name): should have the right to visit the chi ldren as follows: 
(1) I I none. (2) I I reasonable vis i tat ion. (3) I I visi tat ion with the following rest r ic t ions (specify): 
c. Facts in support'of the requested custody and vis i tat ion orders are (specify): 
I I cgntained in thq at tached declaration. 
The Plaintiff herein has .moved to Utah and .plans to release the 
child for adoption. She is planning on moving back here as soon 
as the child has been placed. Plaintiff requests DNA/blood tests. 
d. [ I l request mediation to work out a parenting plan. 
'equest an order for child support or attorney fees, attach a completed Income and Expense Declaration (Family La*). 
] CHILD SUPPORT 
a. | | Public assistance is being provided the chi ldren. 
I I (Name): should be ordered to pay reimbursement for public assistance to 
the children in the amount of: S as of Cdare): , and up to the time of trial. 
b. I I (Name): should be ordered to pay sucport as speci f ied: 
Child's name Sirthdate Monthly amount Payable to 
I I and pay arrearages for support of the children from the date of fi l ing this complaint up to time of trial, 
c I I A wage assignment for child support I I and arrearages should be ordered. 
] NAME C H A N G E I request an order changing the children's names, pursuant to Family Code sect ion 7533, as follows (specity) 
] FEES AND COSTS OF LITIGATION Plaintiff requests that the court order defendant to pay for 
attorney fees 
b. expert tees, guardian ad litem tees, and other costs of the act ion or pretrial proceedings. 
under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct . 
/ 2 5 / 9 4 
G/...BE.LT^N ... _ M^AcuL, kT^jbfeg: 
CTfP£ 03 PRINT NAWSJ (SIC.HATUSE OF PUUNTlFr) 
• Answer - Complaint to Establish Parental Relationship form must be served on the defendant with this complaint. 
NOTICE TO OEFENOANT 
'ou cannot afford an attorney and desire to have one, 
f ask the court to appoint an attorney to represent vou. 
AVISO ALACUSAOO 
Si usted no puede pagarle a un abogado, y quiere que un 
aboaado lo reoresente. ccdra oecirte a la cor te aue le nombre 
SUMMONS 
(CITACION JUDICIAL) 
OTiCE TO DEFENDANT: (Aviso aAcusado) 
DENISE ALLAN 
racoLflruseo/vi.y 
&QLQ PAPA USQD6LA CORT£) 
OU ARE BEING SUED BY PLAINTIFF: 
\ Ud. le esta demandando) 
MARIO G. BELTRAN 
You hava 30 CALENDAR DAYS aftsr this aurrh 
mona la served on you to fHe a typtwritten re-
sponse at tnia court. 
A lattar or phone catf ulU not protect you; your 
typewritten response must ba In prop«r lagal 
form If you want tha court to hoar your case. 
if you do not file your response on fc'ms, you may 
lose the case, and your wages, money and pro-
perty may be taken without further warning from 
the court 
There are other IegaJ requirements. You may 
want to calJ an attorney right away, if you do not 
know an attorney, you may call an attorney refer-
ral service or a legal aid office Ofated In the phone 
book). 
Ditpuit d$ qui /# gntriguan erf* ctUcldn Judicial UMtud 
l/a/ra un pfuo d% 30 DIA8 CALENDARIOS par* prtsandr 
vm raapufi/a itc/llm a miqulnt in §M(M com. 
Un* carta o una lUmid* fc/etf/r/c* no /• o/rtcc/i 
prottccjon; su riiputtti ucrftm a miqulnt (fan* qui 
cvmplfr con /at formtUdidis ligiJit Mpropltdzs si yttad 
quleri qua /a corf* ncuchi au caaa. 
Si u*t&d no prvtinU m ntpuostM a Uampo, puQda porder 
9lc*soryl9pu9dQnqutt*rsu *MlirjQ,Mu dlntroyoUzscQtax 
dm tu proplad*d *Jn *vt*o tdJdonalpor part* da la corf*. 
Exlftoa ot/Q* riqutetto* /igata*. Puede qua ustad qufan 
lUmtr a un ttogido tnmadUlimmtQ. SI no conoca a un 
mbogado, puedt Ilaoiar A un tarvfclo da referenda da 
abogido* o a um ollclni da jjri/cU lag*! (voa. a/ dlrectarlo 
lafaf6nJco). 
'ha name and address of the court is: (Elnombrey dJr&cc]6n de la corta ds) 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
\imWmoT 
D A
^ ^ North MscJay Street 
*ORTH VALLEY DISTRICT 
CAS£ NUU3E PFnrfnson 
NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT 
120 North Maciay Strort 
San Fernando, CalHomfca t^WS 
rha name, address, and talepnona number of plaintiffs attorney, or plaintiff without an attorney. Is: 
Elnombrv. la dlrecclSn y el numero de te&fono delabogado del demandante. o del demandante que no b'ena abogado. es) 
MARIO G. BELTRAN 
21827 CENTURION WAY 
SAUGUS, CA 91350 
( 8 0 5 ) 2 9 6 - 1 0 7 0 
3ATE: OCT 2 6 ClerX, by 
(ActuArio} 
^fficQfo*--- __, Deputy 
CS£AU NOTICE TO THE PERSON SERVED: You ara served 
1. C23 as an individual defendant. 
2. • as tha parson suad under tha fictitious name of (specify): 
3. • on behalf of (specify): 
under: • CCP 4Id 10 (corporation) 
• CCP 41&20 (defunct corporation) 
• CCP A 1&40 (association or partnership) 
P I other: 
A I I hv/npr<5nnalf1fl!ivprvonfctefa); O 0 0 0 2 f > 
( 1 CCP 4 16.60 (minor) 
( I CCP 416.70 (conservatea) 
( I CCP 4 16.90 (individual) 
STANDARD RESTRAINING ORDER - Uniform Parentage Act 
PROHIBICION JUDICIAL ESTANDARE - Ley Unlforrne de Paternldad 
STANDARD UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT RESTRAINING ORDER 
nd the other party are restrained from 
/Ing the minor child or children for whom this action seeks to establish a parent-child relationship from the 
without the prior written consent of the other or an order of the court. 
* restraining orders are effective against petitioner upon filing a petition and against respondent on personal ser-
the summons and petition or on waiver and acceptance of service by respondent. 
are effective until the final decree Is entered, the petition Is dismissed, or the court makes a further order. 
>rders are enforceable anywhere In California by any law enforcement officer who has received or seen a copy 
PROHIBICIONES JUDICIALES ESTANDARES - LEY UNIFORMS DE PATERNIDAD 
m\lr de este momento, a usted y a la otra parte se las prohibe 
saquen del estado al hijo o hljos menores de las partes, para qulenes esta acclcn Judicial procura establecer 
elaclon entre hljoy padres, sin el consentlmlento previa por escrlto de /a otra parte o sin una orden de la corte. 
3 prohlblciones Judlclales entrardn en vigencia para el demandante una vez presentada la petlcidn, y para el 
dado una vez que ^ste reclba la notlflcacldn personal de la cltacldn Judicial y petlcidn, o una vez que renuncle 
>cho a reclWr dicha notiflcacldn y se 66 por notlflcado. 
Inuaran en vigencia hasta que se dicte la declsldn final, la petlcidn sea rechazada o la corte explda Instrucclones 
lales. 
3n hacerse cumpllr en cualquler parte de California por cualquler agente del orden publico que las haya reclbldo 
laya visto una copla de ellas. 
• NOTICE -
erk shall attach this restraining order to the original civil summons and all copies Issued In a proceeding 
the Uniform Parentage Act. Proof oi Its service shall be shown on the proof oi service filed with the court. 
000027 
>ted by Rule 1296.61 STANDARD RESTRAINING ORDERS Coda of Civil Procure. Hi2.2t(b) 
m,nrj m r*,lf„mi» (Uniform Parontag* Act) 
J£ AXO *OOR£SS OP SCNDea; 
ARIO G. BELTRAN 
1827 CENTURION WAY 
AUGUS, CA 913 50 
TELEPHONE NO: ( 8 0 5 ) 2 9 6 - 1 0 7 C J For Coun Use Only: 
iari name or court, JucJioaf district & branch court. If «ny, and Post Offlca ana sirwlAddrros 
UPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
2 0 NORTH MACLAY STREET 
AME 
AN FERNANDO, CA 913 40 
-AINTIFF: MARIO G. BELTRAN 
:F£NDANT: DENISE ALLAN 
NOTICE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT 
P F 0 0 0 5 0 5 
TO: .DENISE ALLEN 
(Insert naroo of indrvldua! beiog servad) 
This summons and other document(s) indicated Delow are being SQrvad pursuant to Section 415.30 of the California 
Code of Civil Procedure. Your failure to complete this form and return it to me within 20 days may subject you (or 
the party on whose behalf you are being served) to liability for th9 payment of any expenses Incurred in serving a 
summons on you In any other manner permitted by (aw. 
Jf you ara being sarved on behalf of a corporation, unincorporated association (including a partnership), of other 
entity, this form must be signed by you in the name of such entity or by a person authorized to receive service of 
process on behalf of such entity. In ail other cases, this form must be signed i^y you personally or by a person authorized 
Dy you to acknowledge receipt of summons. Section 415.30 provides that this summons and other document(s) are 
deemed served on the date you sign the Acknowledgment of Receipt below, If you return thi^form to me. 
Dated: N o v e m b e r .03, . 199.4 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT 
This acknowledges receipt of: (To be completed by sender before mailing) 
1. • A copy of the summons and of the complaint 
2. • A copy of the summons and of the Petition (Marriage) and: 
• Blank Confidential Counseling Statement (Marriage) 
• Order to Show Cause (Marriage) 
iZH Blank Responsive Declaration 
• Blank Financial Declaration , 
E 3 other: (specify) A copy of the Summons, Standard Restraining Orders, 
Complaint: to Establish a Paternal Relationship, Certificate of 
Assignment and blank Answer 
CTo b« co»pl*t*d by r»clpl»oO 
Date of receipt: 
(3/gnaiuro c( person id^owis^ylng toceipi, w;rn tin* rf 
Jtcicncv».^ €c2gmcrn !J .Tada an behalf of anolnar owson) 
Date this form is signed: DENISE ALLEN 
000028 
(Type or print your nana and nama of Bntiry. If any, 
on wMoja banal/ tn»$ 'cm is Bignad) 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
CA3£TITLE BELTRAN v s . ALLAN CASE NUMBER PFnnrison 
CERTIFICATE OF ASSIGNMENT 
lie this certificate with all cases presented for filing In all districts of the Los Angeles Superior Court. 
The under Hgntd deciaraa that tho above anUHod r u n or la Wed for prccaedinge in tna N O R T H V A L L E Y DisWctof 
the Lot i ^ g i l i i Superior court unde/ 3eo>on 332 * eeq.. Coda of CMl Procadum ana flun 2 Cc) and Co) of true coon (or ma reasons checfcad b tfcw. 
Tha addraia of tha aecidvU, performance, p^ny. detention, pl ica of bua lnMa, ex olner facie* which quah'flet lh>a c i i a /or nnng in ma aoove daslgnatad diatnct 
is (not rtqulnd for non-tort case* filed In Central District); 









2 1 8 2 7 CENTURION WAY 
JURY TRIAL C £ ] NON-JURY TfllAl TIKE ESTIMATED FOR TBUL C U HOURS/CD DAYS. 
JRE OF ACTION GROUND NATURE OF ACTION GROUND 
A.7 t 00 VonkSa Aca'd on I 
*72lOUedUaicracCca 
A7200 other Personal Inj. 
A7220 Product Lfacwry 
A605Q Other Waipractica 
A£Ot2Caitecl">civNota 
A6C40 injunci Relief 
&£030 DecLar Relief 
46170 Lata Claim Rsilflf 
*£ooo other CompJt. 
•iW: 
Tna cauto of action arose within lha 
alBUicL 
Of 
ana or mora dafandanta raaidaa within 
lha district 
Of 
Rule 2 a/Jews filing In Cantral DIaIrlcl 
Cnon-lorts ontyl 
t ) « S 2 0 Ragular Dissolution 
C D A5525 Summary a s s e r t i o n 
I 1 A5530 Nullity 
I 1A5610 Legal Separation 
C D A6t35 Far&gn Support 
| 1 A£136 Foreign Custody 
(_ J A6122 Qoneslic Violence 
I I A5130 FaraJty Law Complain c-0 in er 
m A6132Palamrcy 
f ) Afltat OAPatamity (DAuse onfyl 
L 3 A6l33QAAgraimgnl (DAusacnfr) 
Onaorr*areaflhepaMy 
liUganla (aside a withm tha 
district." 
LNol a requirement for 
ruing In Cantral Oislrict -
Aula 2} 
C M d rasldoa or dacaasad 
father'* probata would Da 
filed In lha distr ict ." 
*6011 Concraa 
A7300 E/Tunent Odr&a»n 
hSozo Landiord/Tanant 
A6060 Roat Propony RlghtH 
A6t 40 Admin Award 
A£t$oxbairac! 
» 6 H I SialerSiala Judgment 
17221 Aab^alOBia 
•613«H.E.3.L. 
fcSiti Ulnora Contract 
A£i$0£jacUon Corneal 
Parrwrtanca in tha district ia expreeaty 
provided f o r . " 
Tha proper(y is locatad wltnln tna 
distr ict ." 
f 1 A6101 Agancy Adopton 
( 1Afi i 02 independent Adoption' 
C Z ] >fi 104 Siepparent Adoption 
1 I A £ 103 Adult Adopuon 
( 1 AS 106 Sola Custody Peu'Bcn 
( | A£ 105 Abandcnmanl 
Petitioner raaidaa wiihm 
tna dtstrlcL«* 
or 
Consent to out-of-slale 
adapUon,conaantar 
resides within the district.** 
The administrative tribunal la tocitad 
within Che district** 
Tha judgment debtor holda propany 
within lha dlalricl** 
Uual ba (Had in tho Coo trail D Usenet 




t o i £ i Ma/ida/nus* 
^Qi52Pfon,cxLon« 
*£\5Q OcnefWTlt* 
V66O0 H.C. f amity Law 
One or mora of tt\& p*rcy wcigantt 
fMides within lha diclnct.** 
m a ae/ano«ni funajont wnoity wiinin 
tha dtatfci . ** 
Cnild la hrtd w^t^^ tha D.atnct«« 
1 1 >6210 Pro&ata W*-Littara Twiajiantavy 
d ] A6211 Prooata w\»-LalIa/fl AdmnJalralion 
CZ] A6212 Letters of AdminlslraUcn 
( I A£213 Letters of SpeaaJ Acvwiislrahan 
(ZZI A6215 SpoUMl Property 
I I A6216 Succaaalon Jo flaaJ Property 
r ) MS2\7 Sut*majy Probata 
( I A6218 Smail Efltala C13200 PC) 
[ ] A6230 Ccnsjtfvalom h»g P U 
t j A£Z31 Cona«rvato/anip Parson 
I | A6232 ConBervitonhtp CaUta 
( IA6233 Uadicii TrwlrMnl witneut Content 
! I A6240 Cuardiansh«p P I C 
LZZI A£24t cuo/dianfho Paracn 
( I A6242 Cua/dJmnthtp C i t a u 
I ] AfiZO Soou^» Lacx* Capaaty 
( I A62S4 TnJSt PfOCflfldingi 
( | AQ2CO Probata oihar 
CSpaary): _^  
[ J AA2aa Coop user's cu.ni 
Oecadenl resided within 
the disirict»f 
0 / 
Decadent resided out of 
tho district, but held 
property with in the distr ict" 
or 
Psliooner, conaervataa or" 
ward raaidaa wiin>n irua 
d i s t r i c t ' * 
:Iara under panaity of perjury under tha laws of tha State 
allfornla that tha foregoing Is true and correct and this 
aratlonwaa executed on 1 0 - 2 5 - 9 4 
ANCASTER California 
••Or, Rule 2 allows optional filing In Central Oistrict. 
o o a t i v a w r i t s c o n c e r n i n g a c o u r t o f i n f e r i o r Ju r ismctTo 
CS)CKATUP.£ Cf AnORN£Y/f ILING PAPTYj 
filed In Central Oistrlct. IN PRO P E R 
f - i f - M - l 
Off ic ia l Business 
^.PENALTY FOR PPiVATp l 
USE TO AVCIO PAYMENT— 
- t f ^ r ' C F POSTAGE.-S3COgj^i 
".Print your name, address and ZIP Code here 
SUu^vtf GA Q ^ S O 
p^ l 
000030 
p HIT m a 3E3 
Receipt for 
- Certified Mai! 
•- No Insurance Coverage P.-ovicaa 








y ^ ? / /,. <^2Z^z^y 
'ygxr*""/JT m*/ 
Postage 
Cirti/.-o =,Jv>A &• 
3:>*cQj"Ce.r.-*-, 
£e:eco 
to\%<5£y i I i : « C*.-.e<ed 




Pcstmaf. :* Z-n 
dnJUuv^J 
| SENDER: 
M • Complete items 1 and/or 2 for additional services. 
(3 • Complete items 3. and 4a & b. 
12 • Print your nama and address-'on tha reverse of this fnrm «n ***r w r-m 
a return this card to y o u . 
<jj • . A t t a c h this form to tht 
^ doas not permit. 
,- • Writs "Return Rw^w
 H v. 
i raru or ina m«nyioi.c or an r n * mr i? it M J C C 
• ^v»ww-»wv. « . .« . „ iijau^jicce aeiow tna arace numoer.| 
— • JheReo im Receipc wil l show to whom"tha article was d e l i ' v * " ^ ' ™ * rS^da t -
delivered. O — • : L l _ > , _ 
•a " 3 . Article Addressed to : . * v - ' - ^ » * . . ^_- ^ > > A ^y-> 
I also wish to receive the 





1. D Addressee's Address 
2. & Restricted Delivery 
Consult postmaster for fee. 
4a.^Ar t ic le Number. .-:•: . -_, . 
^ ^ " e g i s t e r e d ^ S L d - I n s u r e d ^ ^ ^ 7 ^ - ^ - ? t : 
^ m f i e d ^ ^ ^ S Q j C O O ^ 
^ ^ ^ s ^ a . l ^ ^ f i ^ ^ 
V?^>V = ^ -^JK : >^&^*Cv leTC 
?6fef£5iSr7«S®BGS 
nvf lecetpc* 
RELINQUISHMENT AND CONSENT TCTJbjOPTION 
(BIRTH MOTHER-UTAH) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF PTAH 
:ss 
) 
&m\m D ^ 
being Erst duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 
i. I am the mother of a -F--
14 day of M c v C r r t b o ^ , 19 ^ 4 , at - P r f r J O 
(male/tgmaig) child who was born at 3'3G<=^rx-(timc) on the 
_ City, L^-t < 9 > - ^ County, State of Utah. 
2. Because I feel that it is in this child's best interests to be placed for adoption, I hereby release and relinquish 
this child to the care, custody and control of LDS Social Services, for placement for adoption. 
3. I fully understand that by signing this Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption I am giving up all of my 
parental rights to this child, and that my decision to place this child for adoption with LDS Social Services is final and 
I cannot change my mind. 
4. I consent to the legal adoption of this child by any persons with whom LDS Social Services places this child 
for adoption. I understand that LDS Social Services will use its best efforts to place this child with the adoptive parents 
I may have selected in consultation with LDS Social Services. I understand and agree that if I have not selected adoptive 
parents or if LDS Social Services, in its sole and absolute discretion, decides that this child should be placed with other 
adoptive parents or that it is not in the child's best interest for the adoptive parents I have selected to complete the 
adoption, LDS Social Services may place this child for adoption with any adoptive parents LDS Social Services selects. 
5. I understand and agree that LDS Social Services may, in its sole discretion, release its custody, and control 
over this child to another licensed child placing agency for adoptive placement within said other agency's sole discretion. 
6. I waive the right to notice of any and all legal proceedings which may be held in courts of the State of Utah, 
or elsewhere, in connection with the adoption of this child. 
7. I have read the foregoing Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption and I fully understand its terms and 
conditions. My decision to relinquish this child to LDS Social Services and to consent to the adoption of this child has 
been made voluntarily and of my own free will and choice. I am signing this Relinquishment and Consent to Adopdon 
freely and voluntarily, without any coercion, force or duress and without any payment or promise to pay any money or 
other thing of value for the purpose of inducing me to place this child for adoption, consent to an adoption, or cooperate 
in the completion of an adoption. 
8. I agree that this Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption shall be executed and interpreted according to the 
laws of the State of Utah, and I agree to submit myself to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah with regard to the subject 






i. Rurlu A /Qckktr 
CERTTFICATION 
, hereby declare that: 
1. I am a representative of LDS Social Services, a licensed child-placing agency, and I have been authorized to 
take relinquishments and consents to adoption. 
2. 1 certify that, to the best of my information and belief, the person executing the foregoing Relinquishment 
and Consent to Adoption has read and understands said Relinquishment and Consent and has signed it freely and 
voluntarily. 
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES 
Rv ^ V A / - f &M.\ 
Page 1 of 2 
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NOTARIZATION 
STATE OF UTAH 




On the I 4 day of f\j o xr^rrO^ar' 
before me Peruse. ^ /1; 
(Birth mother) 
_• 19 r14 , personally appeared 
. who signed the foregoing document in my 
presence and who swore or affirmed to me that her signature is voluntary and the document truthful. 
sm-. NICOLE D.MUHLESTEIN 
/ v C 2 5 : < ^ HOTARY PUBLIC-STATE of UTAH 
/ : / J K ? / X # LDS SOCIAL SERVICES 
:?i mj&yb ; : ; 1190 NORTH 900 EAST 
7 V ^ ^ V / / PROVO, UT 846G4 
X
-^ :C- / COMM. EXP, 8-31-98 
Notary . 
Residing at 
My Commission Fxpires: p • y / • ; 0 
We, \/zl Uwph 
WITNESSES 
and Udd C^ltli 
, arc witnesses 
to the foregoing Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption signed by 
(Birth mother) 
We do each hereby declare as follows: 
1. I am not affiliated with LDS Social Services and I am not a member of the birth mother's family. 
2. The birth mother has stated that she has read and understands the foregoing Relinquishment and Consent 
to Adoption and that the document is truthful 
3. To the best of my information and belief, the birth mother signed this document freely and voluntarily. 
Date: / / / / 7 / f y Witness 
Date: J [ InlW 
Revised 9/93 
Forms\Consent.FRM 
Page 2 of 2 
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David M. McConkie (A2154) 
Merrill F. Nelson (A3841) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Denise Allan and LDS Social Services 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARIO G. BELTRAN, : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF BEVERLY R. 
Plaintiff, : BEKKER 
vs. : 
DENISE ALLAN; LDS SOCIAL : Case No. 950400021 
SERVICES, an Agency of the Church of : 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; and : 
JOHN DOES I through V, : Judge Guy R. Burningham 
Defendants. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Beverly R. Bekker, hereby depose and affirm under oath as follows: 
000033 
1. I am a licensed clinical social worker in the employ of LDS Social Services 
("Agency"), a licensed child placement agency. I work in the Provo, Utah office of the 
Agency. 
2. In the latter part of August 1994, I met with Denise Allan in my office. 
Denise was expecting a child in November 1994 and requested the assistance of the 
Agency in placing her child for adoption. Denise identified Mario G. Beltran, a California 
resident, as the father. 
3. On October 27, 1994, I sent a certified letter to Mario G. Beltran at his 
California address informing Mr. Beltran that Denise was in Utah, that her baby was due 
in November 1994, that she intended to place her baby for adoption, and that she had 
identified him as a possible father of the child. A true and correct copy of the letter is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
4. On or about November 8, 1994, I received a letter from Mr. Beltran 
regarding his filing of a California legal action to establish his paternity of Denise's baby. 
A true and correct copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
5. On November 14, 1994, Denise gave birth to a baby girl in a Utah County 
hospital. 
6. On November 17, 1994, Denise signed a relinquishment and consent to 
adoption, transferring custody of her child to the Agency for the purpose of placing the 
-2-
000034 
child for adoption. A true and correct copy of this document is attached hereto as Exhibit 
C. 
7. On November 17, 1994, immediately following Denise's relinquishment, the 
Agency placed her baby for adoption with the adoptive parents, with whom the baby has 
continuously resided since that date. 
8. On November 16, 1994, prior to the relinquishment, the Agency inquired of 
the Bureau of Vital Statistics to determine whether an acknowledgment of paternity had 
been filed with regard to Denise's baby. No acknowledgment was on file, and a certificate 
to that effect was issued. A true and correct copy of that certificate is attached hereto 
as Exhibit D. 
DATED this£<^_day of September, 1995. 




On thiSc^cJ — day of September, 1995, before me, the undersigned notary, 
personally appeared BEVERLY R. BEKKER, who signed the preceding document in my 




c/o LOS SOCIAL SERVICES 
1190 NORTH 900 EAST 
PROVO, UTAH 84504 
COMM. EXP. 9-5-97 
^ • ? y 
NOYARY PlffiLIC 
Residing at £sif7ri /£&/ 




:%)roifou/. ^ iwrej 
UTAH PROVO AGENCY 
1190 North 900 East 
Provo. Utah 84604 
EXHIBIT A 
October 27, 1994 
Mr. Mario Beltran 
21827 Centorion Way 
Sangus, CA 91350 • 
Dear Mario: 
This letter is to inform you that Denise Allen is being assisted by this agency in making an 
adoption plan for her child which is due to be delivered the end of November 1994. She 
has named you as a possible father of her unborn child. 
Her decision is to place the baby for adoption in a family that can provide stability and a 
socially, emotionally safe environment She desires this child to have all the things the child 
needs at this time that she is not able to provide. 
Thank you for the background information you have already completed. It would be helpful 
if you could complete the family history pages and the WAIVER (in duphcate) signed in the 
presence of a notary. A self-addressed stamped envelope is enclosed for your convenience. 
Sincerely, 
Beverly K. Bekker, 
*S SENDER: 
2 # C o m p e t e items 1 and/or 2 for additional- service*. 
w
 • Cornpleta items 3 . and -ia & b. 
l J. J * Pri»"t your rvarr>« and address on rh« nvnrsB of thi* form «o thai w o can 
** £ return this card to you. 
T p T T T f > • Attach this form to the front of th« mailpwca. or on the back H apace 
A-A^O YY 2 does not permit. 
*2 • Write "Return Receipt Requested" on the m*iTpi«ce bekaw tha trticle ncimb-arJ 




! also wish to receive the 
following services (for an extra 
fee): 
1 . • Addressee's Address 
2. ^ R e s t r i c t e d Delivery 
Consult postmaster for fee. 
3. Art icle Addressed to : 
Mr. Mario Beltran 
21827 Centorion Way 
Sangus, CA 91350 
t T S i g n a t u r i MM 
e (Addressee) 
^ 6. Signature (Agent) 
iny\ (nrbr^.o-x 
4a. Article Number 
4b. Service Type 
• Registered D Insured 
V c e r t i f i e d > D COO 













7. Date of Delivery 
8. Addressee's Address (Only if requested 
and fee is paid) 
PS Form 3 8 1 1 , December 1991 c U.S.G.P.O.: i«2-307-S30 D O M E S T I C R E T U R N RECEIPT 
°- 1^35 P.31/12 
MARIO G. B2LT2AN 
21227 CSTTURIA2T WAY ^ 
SAUGUS, CA 913S0 EXHlbi S 7] 
November 3, 1994 
Beverly a. Backer, LCSW 
L D S Social Services 
Utah Prove Agency 
1190 North 900 East 
Provo, Utah 94 604 
Dear Ms. Bekkar: 
Piaase ha advised that I have filed a Complaint to Establish a 
Paternal Relationship requesting custody of our unborn child in the 
Superior Court of California; Case No. PFG00505. 
I do not intend to give up any of my paternal rights to this child, 
and, after blood testing, if the child proves to be nine, I intend 
to pursue custody of ay child as vigcursly as possible. 
1 an enclosing a copy of the action filed here on October 26, 1994, 
and Denise Allen vill be served vith this action as quickly as that 
can be arranged. 
If you have any questions, please contact iae. 
Yours truly, 
Mario G. Beltran 
MGB/cp 




STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF OTA hi 
ISHiMENT AND CONSENT TCFAI 
(BIRTH MOTHER-UTAH) 
) 
, P T I O N 
E 
) 
I, Q c ^ u s e . X ^ M ^ 
1. I am the mother of a -f^  
14 day of M c v c n a b - C ^ , 19 ^ H , at - P ^ A / 
»
 b c i n S k-sc d u l7 sworn on oath, depose and say: 
(male/^maig) chil i who was bora at 3'3fecP<o^timc^ on the 
2 clrY> [^Ai Q ^ - v ^ County, State of Utah. 
2. Because I feel that it is in this child's best interests to be placed for adoption, I hereby release and relinquish 
this child to the care, custody and control of LDS Social Services, for placement for adoption. 
3. I fully understand that by signing this Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption I am erving up all of my 
parental rights to this child, and that my decision to place this child for adoption with LDS Social Services is final and 
I cannot change my mind. 
4. I consent to the legal adoption of this child by any persons with whom LDS Social Services places this child 
for adoption. I understand that LDS Social Services will use its best efforts to place this child with the adoptive parents 
I may have selected in consultation with LDS Social Services. I understand and agree that if I have not selected adoptive 
parents or if LDS Social Services, in its sole and absolute discretion, decides that this child should be placed with other 
adoptive parents or that it is not in the child's best interest for the adoptive parents I have selected to complete the 
adoption, LDS Social Services may place this child for adoption with any adoptive parents LDS Social Services selects. 
5. I understand and agree that LDS Social Services may, in its sole discretion, release its custody, and control 
over thh child to another licensed child placing agency for adoptive placement within said other agency's sole discrction. 
6. I waive the right to notice of any and all legal proceedings which may be held in courts of the State of Utah, 
or elsewhere, in connection with the adoption of this child. 
7. I have read the foregoing Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption and I fully understand its terms and 
conditions. My decision to relinquish this child to LDS Social Services and to consent to the adoption of this child has 
been made voluntarily and of my own free will and choice. I am signing this Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption 
freely and voluntarily, without any coercion, force or duress and without any payment or promise to pay any money or 
other thing of value for the purpose of inducing me to place this child for adoption, consent to an adoption, or cooperate 
in the completion of an adoption. 
8. I agree that this Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption shall be executed and interpreted according to the 
laws of the State of Utah, and I agree to submit myself to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah with regard to the subject 
matter of this Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption-
Date: 
Tunc: 




I, JtLt')m'U f\ /Pckk^r • hereby declare that: 
1. I am a representative of LDS Social Services, a licensed child-placing agency, and I have been authorized to 
take relinquishments and consents to adoption. 
2. I certify that, to the best of my information and belief, the person executing the foregoing Relinquishment 
and Consent to Adoption has read and understands said Relinquishment and Consent and has signed it freely and 
voluntarily. 
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES 
By, ;L,i/.J d-M*. 
I 
Page 1 of 2 000039 
NOTARIZATION' 
:ss 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF LH<ri~ 
On the _ J J 
before me Q C T U S e . ^ \ \ \\ 
) 
day of f\i o \rtrr^<KX~ 19 *»4 , personally appeared 
. who signed the foregoing document in mv 
(Birth mother) ~~~ 
presence and who swore or affirmed to me that her signature Ls vokStary and the document truthful. 
NICOLE D. MUHLESTEIN 
HOTARX PUBLIC - STATE ol UTAH 
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES 
11 SO NORTH 9CO EAST 





My Commission Expires: Q ' ;I ' I * 
We, Vd,l L/naph <-d>>5 
WITNESSES 
and TnM &r<l(U , arc witnesses 
to the foregoing Relinquishment and Consent to Adoption signed by 
(Birth mother) 
We do each hereby declare as follows: 
1. I am not affiliated with LDS Social Services and I am not a member of the birth mother's family. 
2. The birth mother has stated that she has read and understands the foregoing Relinquishment and Consent 
to Adoption and that the document is truthful. 
3. To the best of my information and belief, the birth mother signed this document freely and voluntarily. 
Date: / / / / 7 / f ? 
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C(iU040 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
CERTIFICATE OF SEARCH 
FOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY BY FATHER 
EXHIBIT B 
Name of Mother 
Denise Al lan 
Place of Child's Birth 
Provo, UT 
Date of Child's Birth 
Nov. 14, 1994 
Sex of Child 
Female 
This is to certify that a search has been made of the records of ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY BY FATHER 
filed w i th the State Office of Vital Statistics and no record was found to be on file. 
1:50 pm Nov. 16, 1994 
DATE OF SEARCH 
?&S£b 
DIRECTOR OF HEALTH STATISTICS 
If an Acknowledgment of Paternity by Father h found on fi le, a certified copy will be issued. If no record is on file, a 




Name. Accress and Telephone No or^:omsy(s) 
a C. Grillo, Esq. 
1 Lyons Avenue, Suite 403 
a Clarita, California 91321-2534 
S Bar 92673 
) 259-0527 
3 
Attorney(s) for WAR 10.. G„.. BELTRAN, 
P l a i n t i f f 
Ccaca aeicw <or usa of Court Cierx Onry G ^ 
vv 








COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTS OF .L0.S. .ANGELES 
(SUPERIOR, MUNICIPAL, or JUSTICE) 
rORTH VALLEY.DISTRICT 
(Name af Municipal or Justice Court Distnct or of orancn court, if any! 
Plamtiff(s): MARIO G. BELTRAN 
Oefendants(s): DENISE ALLAN 
(Abbreviated Title) 
CD 
CASENUM8ER PF 000 505 
REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL 
TYPE CF ACTION 
I I Personal Injury, Property Damage and Wrongful DeattCTl 
I I Motor Vehicle • Other 
rXI Oomestic Relations I I Eminent Domain 
rxi Other: (Specify). Compla in t . . t.o. E s t a b l i s h 
P a t e r n i t y 
TO THE CLERK. Please dismiss th is act ion as follows: (Check applicable boxes.) 
1. • With prejudice E D Without prejudice 
2. CD Entire act ion • Complaint only • Petit ion only 
I I Other: (Specify)3 
• Cross-complaint only 
Dated:. J u n e . 16
 Jm. 19 9 5 
Klf dismissal reauested is of specified parties onry. of specified 
causes of action onry or of speafied cross-camptamts onry. so 
state and identify tne parties, causes of action or cross-complaints 
to oe dismissed. 
LAW OFFICES OF LINDA C. GRILLO 
Attorney(s) for MARIO G. BELTRAN, P l a i n t i f f 
Linda C. G r i l l e Esq. 
(Type or print at torney(s) name(s)) 
TO THE CLERK: Consent to the above dismissal is hereby given." THOMPSON, VHITii, KING & FRENCH 
Dated:.. JV??e.22,.19?5 , „ ^ / - / ^ 
'*wnen a crass-complaint (or Response (Mamage) seeking affirma-
tive relief) is an file, tna attamey(s) for the cross-compiamant 
(resconaent) must sign tnis consent when reauireo oy CCP 
Sai(i).(2Jar(5). 
Attorney(s) for
 D E N I S E A L L A N / Defendant 
Mark T Petersen, ESCN 
(Type or print attorney(s) name(s)) 
*,..(S.:.23S^.. To be completed by clerk) 2 $ Oismissai entered as requested or 
I Oismissai entered on as to only 
I Dismissal not entered as requested for the following reason(s), and attorney(s) notif ied on 




through r4) as present Subsections (1>) tr.fji'sr. 
(i), respectively, and making related grammat-
ical, stylistic, ana reference changes; addec the 
language ceginnmg "witnessed by two mcivic-
uals" at the end of Subsection (1/b); ar.c m-
78-30-4.8. Filing requirements — Children born outside 
of marr iage. 
(1) fa) Any person who is the father or claims tc ce the father of a child born 
outside of marriage may file notice cf his claim of paternity and of his 
willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability with 
the state registrar of vital statistics in the Department of Health. 
(b) The Department of Health shall provide forms for the purpose of 
filing the notices of paternity described in this section. Forms shall be 
made available by the department, in the office cf the county clerk in each 
county, in every hospital, as defined in Subsections 26-21-2(8) and (13), 
and in every licensed child placing agency. 
(2) The notice may be filed prior to the birth of the child but must be filed 
prior to the time the child is relinquished to a licensed child placing agency or 
prior to the filing of a petition by a person with whcm the mother has placed 
the child for adoption. The notice shall be signed by the person filing and shall 
include his name and address, the name and last-known address of the birth 
mother, and either the birthdate of the child or the probable month and year 
of the expected birth of the child. The person whc files a notice under this 
section shall notify the registrar of vital statistics cf any change of his address. 
The Department of Health shall maintain a confidential registry for this 
purpose. 
(3) The Legislature finds that a certain degree cf finality is necessary in 
order to facilitate the state's interest in expediting the adoption of young 
children and in protecting the rights and interests of the child, the birth 
mother, and the adoptive parents. Therefore, any putative father who fails to 
file his notice of paternity is barred from thereafter bringing or maintaining 
any action to assert any interest in the child unless he proves by clear and 
convincing evidence that: 
(a) it was not possible for him to nie a notice of paternity within the 
period of time specified in Subsection ',2); 
(b) his failure to file a notice of paternity was through no fault of his 
own; and 
(c) he filed a notice of paternity within 10 days after it became possible 
for him to file. 
(4) Except as provided in Subsection 75-30-4. L%4\ failure to file a timely 
notice of paternity shall be deemed to be a waiver and surrender of any right 
to notice of any hearing in any judicial proceeding for adoption of the child, and 
the consent of that person to the adoption cf the child is not required. 
(5) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to a child born outside of 
marriage, if there is no showing that a putative father has consented to or 
waived his rights regarding the proposed adoption, it shall be necessary to file 
with the court, prior to its entering a final decree of adoption, a certificate from 
the Department of Health, signed by the state registrar of vital statistics, 
stating that a diligent search has been made of the registry of notices from 
putative fathers of children born outside of marriage and that no filing has 
been found pertaining to the father of the z'nld m question. 
i ?Q 
3e-.ec ":r re r rush men t of a birth mother or 
acttr.ee ar.c s-cst.tuted uit shall be signed anc 
ct--.rmec ---*.- oath oefore' for "by" in tne 
T.troc—tor *r.:rua:re o: present Subsection 
n 
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